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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Appellee/Respondent, 
v. 
WILLIAM JOSEPH IRELAND, 
Appellant/Petitioner. 
Case No. 200050600-SC 
INTRODUCTION 
Petitioner/Appellant William Ireland relies on his opening and replies as follows. 
Matters not addressed in reply were adequately addressed in Petitioner's opening brief or 
do not merit reply. A complete copy of the decision in State v. Ireland, 2005 UT App 
209, 113 P.3d 1028 is in the Addendum to this brief. 
POINT. UTAH'S STATUTORY SCHEME REQUIRES THAT THE ROBBER DO 
SOMETHING MORE THAN GESTURE WITH A FINGER IN HIS POCKET IN 
ORDER TO ELEVATE A ROBBERY TO AN AGGRAVTED ROBBERY 
Under Utah's statutory scheme, the definition of dangerous weapon requires 
more than the representation of an item. Because the plain language of the statute 
requires something in addition to the representation of an item, a gesture with a finger in 
the pocket, without more, does not fit within the definition. Requiring that a robber 
indicate that he will use the item or otherwise do something in addition to representing an 
item is consistent with the language of the statute and does not require that a victim 
ascertain whether the robber is actually armed. Instead, such a requirement tracks the 
lamguage of the statute and ensures that a distinction between simple and aggravated 
robbery is maintained. 
As an initial matter, the state's suggestion on page 12-13 of its brief that a 
gesture with a finger is sufficient to elevate the crime to aggravated robbery because it 
creates a threat of harm disregards the fact that in all robberies, simple or aggravated, 
there is a threat of harm. In fact, the crime of robbery explicitly requires that a 
perpetrator take or attempt to take property from another by means of force or fear. Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-301 (2003). While the state is correct that victims do not generally 
give another person property unless they feel threatened, victims of simple robberies as 
well as victims of aggravated robberies feel threatened. Such a response, however, is not 
sufficient to elevate a robbery to an aggravated robbery. Instead, the robber must 
represent that he has an item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury and do 
something further that either causes the victim to reasonably believe that the item is likely 
to cause death or serious bodily injury or represent that he is in control of such an item. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601(5) (2003). 
Because the Legislature explicitly included more than just the representation of an 
item in its definition of dangerous weapon, rules of statutory construction require that a 
robber do more than represent an item in order to elevate a crime to an aggravated 
robbery. In interpreting a statute, this Court is required to "'presume that the legislature 
used each word advisedly and give effect to each term according to its ordinary and 
accepted meaning.9" See State v. Barrett, 2005 UT 88, \2% 540 Utah Adv. Rep. 9 
9 
(interpreting Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-402 (2003) (other citations omitted)). This means 
that courts should not interpret a statute so as to render portions of the statute superfluous. 
LaBelle v. McKay Dee Hospital Center, 2004 UT 15, 1J16, 89 P.3d 113. If a concealed 
gesture is considered sufficient to support an aggravated robbery, such an interpretation 
of the dangerous weapon statute would render subsections (i) and (ii) as well as the 
connector "and" superfluous. 
The state apparently agrees that the subjective reaction of the victim should not 
control the determination of whether a robbery is elevated to an aggravated robbery. 
State's brief at 14, 24-6. In fact, the state devotes a portion of its brief to an argument 
that a victim should not be required to verify whether a robber is actually armed. State's 
brief at 24-6. Requiring that a robber do something more than represent an item that is 
capable of causing death or serious bodily injury in order to aggravate a robbery does not 
require that a victim ascertain whether the robber is actually armed. Instead, it requires 
an objective assessment of whether the robber acted in a manner that indicated not only 
that he had an item capable of causing death or serious bodily injury but also that he 
would use that item or otherwise acted in a way that led the victim to reasonably believe 
that the item was likely to cause death or serious bodily injury. 
Because a gesture with a finger in the pocket, standing alone, does not meet the 
definitional requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 76-l-601(5)(b), it does not elevate a 
robbery to an aggravated robbery. 
3 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner/Appellant William Ireland, by and through counsel, respectfully 
requests that this Court reverse the decision of the court of appeals and hold that a 
concealed gesture in a pocket is not sufficient to elevate a robbery to an aggravated 
robbery. 
SUBMITTED this£FftMay of January, 2006. 
JOAN C. WATT 
MICHAEL PETERSON 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant 
4 
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ADDENDUM 
Vtesflaw. 
113 P.3d 1028 Pagel 
113 P.3d 1028, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 2005 UT App 209 
(Cite as: 113 P.3d 1028, 2005 U T App 209) 
f> 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Appellee, 
v. 
William Joseph IRELAND, Defendant and 
Appellant. 
No. 20040502-CA. 
May 12, 2005. 
Background: Defendant was convicted 
pursuant to conditional plea of guilty in the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department, 
Paul G. Maughan, J., of aggravated robbery. 
Defendant appealed. 
Holding: The Court of Appeals, Billings, 
P.J., held that defendants nonverbal gesture 
of pointing his hand inside his coat pocket 
close to his right side with his elbow 
extended constituted representation of 
dangerous weapon, so as to establish 
aggravated robbery charge. 
Affirmed. 
West Headnotes 
Robbery €^^l l 
342kl 1 Most Cited Cases 
Defendant's nonverbal gesture of pointing 
his hand inside his coat pocket close to his 
right side with his elbow extended 
constituted representation of dangerous 
weapon, so as to establish aggravated 
robbery charge; dangerous weapon statute, 
defining dangerous weapon as including 
facsimile or representation of any item 
capable of causing death or serious bodily 
injury, included nonverbal gestures, gesture 
was intended to look like gun for purpose of 
influencing sales person to give defendant 
all of the cash in cash drawer, and sales 
person reasonably believed that item was 
intended to cause death or serious bodily 
injury. 
*1028 Michael A. Peterson and Joan C. 
Watt, Salt Lake Legal Defender Association, 
Salt Lake City, for Appellant. 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Attorney General, and 
Brett J. DelPorto, Assistant Attorney 
General, Salt Lake City, for Appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, P.J., and DAVIS and 
JACKSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
**1 Defendant William Joseph Ireland 
(Ireland) appeals the trial court's judgment 
convicting him of aggravated robbery under 
Utah Code section 76-6-302. See Utah Code 
Ann. $ 76-6-302 (2004V We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
**2 On December 6, 2003, Jeffrey 
Reinkoester (Reinkoester) worked as a sales 
person in the Fortier jewelry store in the 
Gateway Plaza in Salt Lake City. Ireland 
entered the store wearing a thick, puffy coat 
and a beanie. Reinkoester greeted Ireland 
who responded, "I want you to go and get 
me all the money in the cash drawer right 
now. I'm not kidding. Hurry." As Ireland 
made this demand, he pointed at Reinkoester 
with his right hand, which he kept concealed 
in the pocket of his coat. Ireland's hand was 
held close to his right side with his elbow 
extending behind him. Reinkoester 
observed that Ireland gestured like he had a 
gun and described Ireland's hand in his coat 
pocket as "pointing at [Reinkoester]." 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
113 P.3d 1028 
113 P.3d 1028, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 2005 
(Cite as: 113 P.3d 1028, 2005 UT App 209) 
Ireland's hand was "definitely gesturing like 
there was a weapon, but it was more subtle." 
Ireland made no verbal statement that he had 
a gun or weapon, and Reinkoester did *1029 
not see a gun, but Reinkoester thought that 
Ireland might have a gun due to Ireland's 
gesturing in his pocket. Reinkoester thought 
he may be shot if he did not comply with 
Ireland's request. 
**3 Reinkoester walked behind the counter 
toward the cash drawer and put what little 
cash the store had in a bag. The counter was 
too high for Reinkoester to see Ireland's 
hands, so Reinkoester could not tell if 
Ireland had his hand in his pocket. Holding 
up a roll of quarters, Reinkoester asked 
Ireland whether he wanted the change and 
Ireland responded, "[F]ill it with jewelry." 
Before Reinkoester could fill the bag with 
jewelry, Ireland said, "[J]ust give it to me," 
grabbed the bag, and ran to the front door. 
**4 Meanwhile, Nelson Fortier (Fortier), 
the storeowner, realized a robbery was in 
progress. Fortier exited the store and 
attempted to block the doors so that Ireland 
could not exit. Ireland pushed and 
eventually opened the door. Fortier chased 
Ireland and demanded he return the money. 
Ireland complied, then ran away, but was 
laler arrested. 
**5 Ireland was charged with one count of 
aggravated robbery, a first degree felony 
pursuant to Utah Code section 76-6-302, and 
theft of services, a class B misdemeanor in 
violation of Utah Code section 76-6-409. 
See Utah Code Ann. § § 76-6-302, -409 
(2004). Ireland moved to reduce the charge 
of aggravated robbery to simple robbery, a 
second degree felony. After a hearing, the 
trial court denied the motion. Ireland 
subsequently entered a conditional plea of 
guilty to aggravated robbery, reserving the 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No 
Page 2 
App 209 
right to appeal the denial of his motion. 
Ireland now appeals. 
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
**6 At issue is whether the trial court 
properly interpreted Utah Code sections 76-
6-302 and 76-1-601 in convicting Ireland of 
aggravated robbery. We review the lower 
court's interpretation of statutes for 
correctness. See State v. Pixton, 2004 UT 
App 2755 4,98P.3d433. 
ANALYSIS 
**7 Ireland argues that the trial court erred 
by convicting him of aggravated robbery 
pursuant to Utah Code sections 76-6-302 
and 76-1-601 (the aggravated robbery and 
dangerous weapon statutes respectively) 
because there was insufficient evidence to 
support the conviction. The aggravated 
robbery statute provides that "[a] person 
commits aggravated robbery if in the course 
of committing a robbery, he ... uses or 
threatens to use a dangerous weapon as 
defined in Section 76-1-601." Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-6-302. The dangerous weapon 
statute defines "[djangerous weapon" as 
including a "facsimile or representation" of 
"any item capable of causing death or 
serious bodily injury." Id. § 76-1-
601(5)(a),(b). Moreover, "the actor's use or 
apparent intended use of the item [must] 
lead[ ] the victim to reasonably believe the 
item is likely to cause death or serious 
bodily injury." M S 76-1-601(5)(b)(i). 
**8 Utah courts have upheld convictions 
for aggravated crimes when there has been 
some kind of verbal representation or threat 
that the defendant possessed a dangerous 
weapon, even where the defendant did not 
display the weapon. See State v. Hartmann, 
783 P.2d 544, 547 (Utah 1989) (upholding 
conviction for aggravated sexual assault 
where defendant raped a woman while 
L to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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telling her that he had a gun); State v. 
Revos. 2004 UT App 151,1 3, 91 P.3d 861 
(upholding aggravated robbery conviction 
where defendant yelled, "Get the gun and 
shoot," and "shoot to kill" during the 
robbery but did not display a weapon); State 
v. Candelario, 909 P.2d 277, 277 (Utah 
Ct.App.1995) (upholding sentence 
enhancement for robbery where defendant 
claimed to have a gun and threatened to kill 
the cashier but did not display or gesture that 
he had a weapon); State v. Adams, 830 P.2d 
310, 311 (Utah Ct.App. 1992) (upholding 
aggravated robbery conviction where 
defendant verbally threatened to use a gun 
while putting his hand on his bulging 
pocket). 
**9 Ireland argues that the pointing gesture 
inside his coat pocket does not constitute a 
"representation" because it was not verbal. 
We disagree and hold that the statute does 
not require a "representation" to be *1030 
verbal, but rather includes nonverbal 
gestures. 
**10 In Candelario, we interpreted the 
term "representation" in a similar section of 
the Utah Code to include nonverbal actions. 
909 P.2d at 278. Specifically, Utah Code 
section 76-3-203(2) (the enhancement 
statute) provides that a sentence may be 
enhanced by one year when " 'a dangerous 
weapon or a facsimile or the representation 
of a dangerous weapon, as provided in 
Section 76-1-601' " is used while 
committing a second degree felony. 
Candelario, 909 P.2d at 278 (emphasis 
added) (quoting Utah Code Ann. $ 76-3-
203(2) (1995) (amended to what is now 
Utah Code Ann. $ 76-3-203.8(2004))). We 
defined "representation" as "an expansive 
term," meaning "a statement conveying an 
impression for the purpose of influencing 
action." I(L_ Moreover, we noted that "[s]uch 
a statement can be either in the form of a 
verbal assertion or nonverbal action." Id. at 
278 n. 2 (citing Utah R. Evid. 801(a)). 
Therefore, we conclude that "representation 
of a dangerous weapon" as provided by 
section 76-l-601(5)(b) can be in the form of 
a nonverbal gesture. TFN11 
FN1. Our conclusion is consistent 
with other jurisdictions interpreting 
statutory language similar to Utah's. 
These jurisdictions have found that 
nonverbal communications are 
sufficient to establish aggravated or 
armed robbery charges when the 
victim reasonably believes the 
defendant has a dangerous weapon. 
See State v. Ellison, 169 Ariz. 424, 
819 P.2d 1010, 1011, 1012 
(Ariz.Ct.App.1991) (upholding 
defendants' conviction of armed 
robbery under Arizona armed 
robbery statute where defendants 
committed robberies by 
"simulating] that they had handguns 
in their pockets at the time they were 
demanding money"); DeLeon v. 
State, No. CACR 89-118, 1989 WL 
148106, at *1 , 1989 Ark. App. 
LEXIS 608, at *3 (Ark.Ct.App. Dec. 
6, 1989) (upholding armed robbery 
conviction under Arkansas statute 
providing that defendant must 
"represent[ ] by word or conduct" 
that he is armed with a deadly 
weapon where defendant asked for 
money while he had his hand in his 
pocket and the victim believed 
defendant had a weapon or gun in his 
pocket); State v. Arena, 235 Conn. 
67, 663 A.2d 972, 973, 978 (1995) 
(determining defendant's action of 
placing an opaque bag on the counter 
with an object inside pointing at the 
clerk while stating "[pjut all the 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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(Cite as: 113 P.3d 1028, 2005 UT App 209) 
money in a bag" satisfied 
Connecticut's armed robbery statute 
because defendant "represented by 
his words or conduct" that he had a 
firearm); State v. Lawrence, No. 
9706017912, 2001 WL 1021385, at 
*2, 2001 Del.Super. LEXIS 318, at 
*7 (DeLSuper.Ct. Aug. 28, 2001) 
(upholding conviction of robbery in 
the first degree under Delaware 
statute providing that defendant must 
"display[ ] what appears to be a 
deadly weapon" where defendant 
wrapped a cloth around his hand so 
that it appeared to hide a gun, and 
where the victim reasonably believed 
that defendant was armed (quotations 
and citations omitted)), affd, 790 
A.2d 476 (Del.2002): People v. 
Taylor. 245 Mich.App. 293, 628 
N.W.2d 55, 57, 61 (2001) (stating 
"we decline to hold that a defendant 
must verbally threaten the victim 
with some specific bodily harm in 
order to obtain a conviction of armed 
robbery" where armed robbery 
statute requires robber to be "armed 
with a dangerous weapon, or any 
article used or fashioned in a manner 
to lead the person so assaulted to 
reasonably believe it to be a 
dangerous weapon"); People v. 
Lopez, 135 A.D.2d 443, 522 
N.Y.S.2d 145, 146 (1987) (holding 
that where an unarmed robber holds 
his hand in his pocket so as to give 
the impression that he is holding a 
gun, he has " '[displayed] what 
appears to be a firearm' within the 
meaning of the [armed robbery] 
statute" and "there is no requirement 
that the object need be anything 
other than the defendant's hand" 
(first alteration in original) (quoting 
People v. Knowles. 79 A.D.2d 116, 
Page 4 
123, 436 N.Y.S.2d 25 (N.Y.1981))). 
**11 Turning to the facts of this case, we 
determine that Ireland's gesture of pointing 
his hand inside his coat pocket close to his 
right side with his elbow extended 
constitutes a representation of a dangerous 
weapon because such gesture was intended 
to look like a gun for the purpose of 
influencing Reinkoester to give Ireland all of 
the cash in the cash drawer. [FN21 
FN2. Ireland relies heavily upon 
State v. Suniville, 741 P.2d 961 
(Utah 1987), where the Utah 
Supreme Court held, under a 
previous version of the aggravated 
robbery statute, that the defendant 
did not commit aggravated robbery 
where he had his hand in his pocket 
held up over the counter as if he had 
a gun, and made threats that he 
would "blast" people if they did not 
cooperate. Id. at 962. The prior 
version of the aggravated robbery 
statute narrowly defined aggravated 
robbery as where the perpetrator 
used "a firearm or a facsimile of a 
firearm, knife or a facsimile of a 
knife or a deadly weapon." Id.; 
Utah Code Ann. § 7 6 - 6-302 (1978). 
The court held that the "[defendant's 
menacing gesture accompanied by 
verbal threats is not sufficient 
evidence alone to establish the use of 
a firearm or a facsimile of a firearm. 
To hold otherwise would pervert the 
language of section 76-6-302 and 
erode the statutory distinction 
between robbery and aggravated 
robbery." Id. at 965. However, since 
the Suniville decision, the Utah 
Legislature amended the aggravated 
robbery statute to include not only a 
"facsimile" but also a 
© 2006 Thomson/West. No Claim to Orig. U.S. Govt. Works. 
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"representation" of "any item capable 
of causing death or serious bodily 
injury." Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-
601(5)(a),(b)(2004). 
*1031 **12 Moreover, we determine that 
Reinkoester reasonably believed that the 
"item [was] intended to cause death or 
serious bodily injury." Utah Code Ann. § 
76-l-601(5)(b)(i) (2004). Reinkoester 
testified that he feared that if he did not 
comply with Ireland's request, he may be 
shot. Guns by their very nature are capable 
of causing death or serious bodily injury. 
Reinkoester's belief was based not only on 
the subjective belief that he thought Ireland 
had a gun, but also on objective evidence. 
Reinkoester saw something "pointing at 
[him]" inside Ireland's coat pocket. That 
something "looked like a gun." This is 
sufficient objective evidence to support a 
reasonable belief that one might have been 
injured if he or she did not comply. See, 
e.g., Parker v. State. 271 Ark. 84, 607 
S.W.2d 378, 379 (1980) (holding that 
victim's subjective apprehension coupled 
with defendant's objective conduct was 
sufficient to sustain a conviction of 
aggravated robbery); Faulkner v. State, 260 
Ga.App. 794, 581 S.E.2d 365, 367 (2003) 
(determining that victim had "reasonable 
apprehension" where defendant used his 
hand covered with a sock to look like a gun 
and pressed it against victim's back); People 
v. Taylor. 245 Mich.App. 293, 628 N.W.2d 
55, 61 (2001) (holding there was ample 
objective evidence that defendant either had 
a gun or simulated one so as to deliberately 
lead complainant to "reasonably believe" he 
had a gun where defendant "placed his hand 
inside his jacket and into the front of his 
pants"). 
CONCLUSION 
**13 We hold that the trial court correctly 
interpreted the aggravated robbery and 
dangerous weapon statutes and uphold 
Ireland's conviction for aggravated robbery. 
Accordingly, we affirm. 
**14 WE CONCUR: JAMES Z. DAVIS 
and NORMAN H. JACKSON, Judges. 
113 P.3d 1028, 525 Utah Adv. Rep. 28, 
2005 UT App 209 
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